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Danuta Mendelson* 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SENSU STRICTO IN AUSTRALIA 
1. Introduction 1 
Punitive damages sensu stricto (also known as 'exemplary' and 'vindictive')2 are awarded 
as part of a civil claim for damages in tort. 3 This chapter outlines the position of common 
law punitive damages in the context of civil punishments as they exist in the present -day 
Australia. The Commonwealth of Australia is a Federation comprising of six States (New 
South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Western Australia and Queensland) 
and two Territories (the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory). In 
general, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK),4 vests the Federal 
Parliament with an exclusive Commonwealth power to make laws with respect to powers 
specified under the Constitution5 as well as enumerated concurrent federal and State 
powers;6 States are also vested with exclusive State power to enact laws within the fields 
of their legislative competence. 7 These fields include the law of torts, which until 2002 
was mainly governed by case law. 
4 
Danuta Mendelson holds a Chair in Law (Research) at Deakin University School of Law, Australia. 
This chapter is based on a paper presented at the 15th Congress of the Ius Commune on 26 November 
2010. I am very grateful to Prof. Dr. Van Dam, Mrs. Lotte Meurkens and the organizers of the Workshop 
on Liability and Insurance for inviting me to the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. 
Whitfeld v. De Lauret (1920) 29 CLR 71, per Isaac J. at p. 81. 
Tue Australian law of contract does not recognise punitive damages; however, punitive damages for a 
breach of contract may be awarded under the law of torts if the defendant's conduct also amounts to a 
tort which sounds in such damages. 
As well as subsequent enabling statutes. 
Under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s. 122, the Federal Parliament may make laws 
for the government of any territory. 
Concurrent powers of the Commonwealth Government are enumerated ins. 51 of the Commonwealth 
of Australia Constitution. 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, s. 107, 108 and 109'. While the Commonwealth and the States 
have the power to make laws within their respective fields of exclusive power; States are precluded from 
enacting valid legislation where the Commonwealth has 'covered the field': Victoria v. The Commonwealth 
('the Payroll Tax Case') [1971) HCA 16; (1971) 122 CLR 353; New South Wales v. Commonwealth (2006) 
229CLR1. 
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Punitive damages were developed by the English common law judiciary in the 18th 
century. The High Court of Australia has affirmed the institution of punitive damages. 8 
However, some judicial decisions relating to punitive damages have been overcome by 
statutory provisions, though the process of legislative intervention is still continuing. In 
order to elucidate the uneasy relationship between the common law approach to punitive 
damages and legislative responses to this institution within modern Australian torts 
jurisprudence, I shall briefly examine: 
(a) Conceptual and taxonomic differences between compensatory and punitive damages 
(§2); 
(b) The most notable English historical precedents (§3); 
(c) Common law punitive damages within the modern Australian legal framework 
(§4); 
(d) Statutory compensation and restitution orders under criminal law (§5); 
(e) Distinction between punitive and aggravated damages (§6); 
(f) The place of common law Punitive Damages in contemporary Australian jurisprudence 
(§7). 
The sole purpose of punitive damages is punishment and deterrence.9 Yet, they are 
awarded within the context of the law of torts - a civil jurisdiction, the primary aim of 
which is compensation. 
2. Difference in the Law of Torts between Compensatory & Punitive 
Damages 
As a general rule, Australian courts award two categories of damages for tortiously 
inflicted harm10: compensatory and punitive.11 Each category reflects a different 
conception of the law of torts: (I) as the quintessentially private law of compensation 
through monetary redress and (2) as a judicial mechanism for setting normative 
standards within society by way of deterrence through monetary punishment. 12 
9 
J() 
11 
2 
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In Garcia v. National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395 Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne 
J.J. stated at p. 403 [at 17]: 'It should be emphasised that it is for this Court alone to determine whether 
one of its previous decisions is to be departed from or overruled'. 
I shall refer to this head of damages as 'punitive damages'. 
In certain actions, for example nuisance, the equitable remedy of injunction may be granted. 
Whitfeld v. De Lauret (1920) 29 CLR 71, Knox C.J. at p. 77: 'Damages may be either compensatory or 
exemplary. Compensatory damages are awarded as compensation for and are measured by the material 
loss suffered by the plaintiffs. Exemplary damages are given only in cases of conscious wrongdoing in 
contumelious disregard of another's rights'. 
For a general discussion see: Goldberg, 2004. See also, e.g.: Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd 
and Another v. DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty (2007) 157 FCR 564, per Black C.J. and Jacobson J. at p 570 
[43]: 'The objectives of an award of additional damages include deterrence: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 
115(4)(b)(ia). An element of penalty is an accepted factor in the remedy: Autodesk v. Yee (1996) 68 FCR 
391 at p. 384'. 
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Compensatory damages are based on the principle of restitutio in integrum as 
articulated by Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co.:13 
'where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money to be given 
for reparation of damages you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will 
put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have 
been in if he had not sustained the wrong'. 14 
These damages include fair compensation 15 for past and future economic loss; any needs 
created by the wrongful conduct that would not otherwise have existed;16 and non-
economic or non-pecuniary loss such as pain and suffering. 17 However, where the 
plaintiff's harm involves 'injury to the plaintiff's feelings caused by insult, humiliation 
and the like'18 the court, particularly in actions for intentional torts, may also award 
aggravated damages, which form part of compensatory system. The High Court of 
Australia in New South Wales v. Ibbett19 emphasized that: 
'Aggravated damages are a form of general damages, given by way of compensation for injury 
to the plaintiff, which may be intangible, resulting from the circumstances and manner of the 
wrongdoing. 20 ' 
When awarding aggravated damages, the court assesses monetary value of the 'intangible' 
emotional harm (shame, degradation, dishonour, etc) sustained by the plaintiff, while 
treating it as compensable loss. 
Punitive damages are different - the Australian High Court in XL Petroleum 
(NSW) Pty. Ltd v. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd,21 , a case involving trespass to land, 
emphasised the acceptability of punishment22 and deterrence as legitimate goals of 
civil actions: 
13 
14 
15 
16 
l8 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co (1880] 5 AC 25 at p. 39. 
See also: Brighty v. Norton (1862) 75 Eng. Rep. 1256 at p. 1258, per Blackburn J. 
Teubner v. Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491, per Windeyer J. at p. 505. 
In Griffiths v. Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161, the High Court of Australia followed the English Court 
of Appeal decision in Donnelly v. Joyce (1974) QB 454. For further discussion see: Mendelson, 2005. 
Trespassory torts are actionable per se: damages are awarded for infringement of the claimant's 
dignitary interests (sense of dignity, honour and decorum) through battery, assault, false imprisonment, 
and trespass to land. 
Lamb v. Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1at8, adopting Lord Devlin's definition in Rookes v. Barnard (No.l) 
(1964] AC 1129. 
New South Wales v. Ibbett [2006] HCA 57; (2006) 229 CLR 638. 
Ibid., at 646-7(§ 31]. Their Honours referred to Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118 
at p. 129-130. 
XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448, at p. 471. 
In Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v. Uren (1967) 117 CLR 118; affirmed by the Privy Council in 
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v. Uren (1967) 117 CLR 221, the Australian High Court rejected the 
restrictive approach adopted by the House ofLords in Rookes v. Barnard (1964) AC 1129. 
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'an award of exemplary damages is intended to punish the defendant for conduct showing a 
conscious and contumelious disregard for the plaintiff's rights and to deter him from 
committing like conduct again .. .' 
Consequently, these damages are aimed at the defendant, and the court does not 
determine their quantum by reference to the plaintiff's injury,23 but on the basis of 
whether the defendant's conduct calls for a judicial retribution in the name of 
deterrence. 24 
The dichotomy between punishment and compensation goes back to the distinction 
drawn by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle distinguished rules and forms 
governing distributive justice, from the principles of 'corrective' justice.25 The position 
of punishment within this paradigm has been a matter of controversy ever since the time 
of rediscovery of Aristotelian works in the 12th century, and is still unsettled. Lee26 
argued that criminal law is not part of corrective justice, even though it 'might seem at 
first sight its most natural interpretation'.27 This is because 'a crime is usually committed 
on the person or property of an individual'; however, 'criminal law is not concerned with 
the offence as an offence against the individual or with the adjustment of individual 
rights; it is concerned with the offence ... against public order, against the regulations 
laid down to ensure an orderly social life'.28 
Offences against public order attract punishment, and as such, they are the bailiwick 
of public, not private, law. This is particularly true of common law, which since the 14th 
century has developed two independent jurisdictional streams - criminal and civil - to 
adjudicate wrongful conduct. According to Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, 29 private wrongs involve 'an infringement or privation of the 
private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals', whereas public 
wrongs are based on 'a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the 
whole community'. Civil proceedings for damages in tort focus on determining 
defendant's liability and assessment of compensation for the harm sustained by the 
individual claimant. In criminal proceedings, however, the Crown in the right of State 
takes over from the victim of the crime, focusing on the question whether the defendant 
has committed an offence against public law and the appropriate punishment for this 
transgression. Consequently, criminal and civil proceedings differ markedly in aims, 
rules and procedures. For example, the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt 
governs criminal prosecutions, whereas outcomes in civil litigation are determined on 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
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Gray v. Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1 at p. 7[15]. 
Whitfeld v. De Lauret (1920) 29 CLR 71, Isaacs]. at p. 81: 'From a very early period exemplary damages 
have been considered by very eminent Judges to be punitive for reprehensible conduct and as a 
deterrent'. 
Aristotle 1934, ch ii, p. 113lb. Corrective justice has also been referred to as 'rectificatory' or 
'commutative' justice'. 
Lee, 1937. 
Ibid., at p. 130. 
Ibid. 
Blackstone 1768,p. 2. Blackstone's definition reflected the Roman law's approach to the division of 
unlawful conduct. 
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the basis of the civil standard of proof (the balance of probabilities);30 limitation of 
actions periods are quite different, as is the admissibility of evidence, 31 etc. 
However, the line separating private from public wrongs is not always clear; contingent 
as it is on the hierarchy of moral values and socio-political preferences of a society at a 
given time: under common law, the same incident can give raise to criminal prosecution 
and civil litigation. In his Commentaries, Blackstone provided an example of criminal 
conversation with a man's wife (adultery), which at the time was both, a public crime 
enforced in ecclesiastical courts and a tort, 'wherein the damages recovered [from the 
adulterer] are usually very large and exemplary'.32 
3. Wilkes v. Wood -The English Precedent 
Blackstone referred to 'exemplary' damages twice (in relation to the now obsolete wrong 
of criminal conversation, and in cases where creators of nuisance do not remove or abate 
nuisance after the initial verdict against them). 33 However, he avoided any discussion of 
their nature, and did not comment on the case of Wilkes v. Wood, 34 with which, given 
its importance and fame, 35 he would have been familiar. In Wilkes v. Wood Richard 
Pratt, the Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas thus distinguished compensatory 
from punitive damages: 
'A jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are 
designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the 
guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the 
jury to the action itself'. 
In Wilkes v. Wood, John Wilkes, controversial Member of Parliament and a political 
journalist, successfully claimed damages for trespass to land. He was charged with 
seditious libel over the Editorial in the (1763) 45 The North Briton (his weekly publication 
devoted to political polemics and satire), which attacked George Ill's speech to the 
Parliament on the Paris Peace Treaty of 1763. Mr. Wood, as the King's messenger (he was 
accompanied by a constable and four other messengers), acting under a general warrant 
issued by Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State, entered Wilkes' house, 'breaking his locks, 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
See for example: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s. 140 Civil proceedings: standard of proof: '(l) In a civil 
proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved 
on the balance of probabilities. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in 
deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account: (a) the nature of the cause of action or 
defence; and (b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and (c) the gravity of the matters 
alleged'. Reproduced ins 140 of Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) and Evidence Act 
2008 (Vic) respectively. 
Hollington v. F. Hewthorn and Company, Ltd, and Another (1943] KB 587. 
Blackstone 1768, p. 139. 
Blackstone 1768,p. 220. 
Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng Rep 489. 
Between 1763 and 1769 approximately 40 cases, known as the Wilkes Cases came before the courts on 
the issue of general warrants. 
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and seizing his papers, &c'. Pratt C.J. found the general warrant to be invalid (it did not 
include inventory 'of the things thus taken away' and no offenders names were specified 
in the warrant);36 jury awarded Wilkes £1000 (a very considerable sum at the time). 
While historically, juries were known to award damages that were sufficiently large to 
suggest an element of punishment, 37 Wilkes v. Wood was the first case in which the 
court adopted punitive (exemplary) awards as a separate head of damages. Though the 
doctrine was formulated by the Court of Common Pleas rather than the Court of King's 
Bench, by the end of the 18th century, punitive damages came to be frequently awarded 
in actions for intentional torts (assault, battery, 38 false imprisonment), 39 as well as torts 
(for example, libel) in which malice had to be established.40 
Punitive damages formed part of the English law, and were received into the Colony 
of New South Wales in 1828. Until the enactment of the Privy Council (Limitation of 
Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth); the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth) 
and the decision in Kirmani v. Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd [No. 2],41 it was a judicial 
practice in Australia to follow precedents from the English appellate courts. It is not 
surprising therefore that according to Isaacs J. of the High Court of Australia, in The 
Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v. McGregori2 (a defamation case), punitive damages 
were 'a special doctrine of substantive law which was gradually evolved',43 allowing: 
'damages by way of retribution as contrasted with compensation, representing what Pollock 
calls 'indignation at the defendant's wrong rather than a value set upon the plaintiff's loss' 
(Torts, 121h ed., p. 189)'. 
Isaacs J. cited the statement of Heath J. in the English case of Merest v Harvey44 that 
juries were 'permitted to punish insult by exemplary damages'.45' 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
4$ 
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In Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (CP 1763); 2 Wils KB 205 Pratt C.J. found general warrants 
to be invalid; on appeal Lord Mansfield determined that only general warrants not authorised by statute 
should declared invalid. 
See: Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (CP 1763); Fabrigas v. Mostyn (1774) 2 Black, W. 929 at 
p. 929; 96 Eng. Rep. 549 at p. 549, per De Grey C.J. 
Grey v. Grant (1764) 2 Wils 251; 95 English Reports 794; Merest, Esq v. Harvey (1814) 128 English 
Reports 761; 5 Taunton 442. 
Beardmore v. Nathan Carrington (1764) 2 Wils 244 95 English Reports 791; Edgell v. Francis (1840) 133 
English Reports 315. 
Bramley v. Chesterton (1857) 2 CB (NS) 592; 140 English Reports 548. 
Kirmani v. Captain Cook Cruises Pty. Ltd. [No. 2] (1985) 159 CLR 461. 
The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v. McGregor (1929) 41CLR254 at p. 266. 
Ibid., at p. 266. 
Merest v. Harvey (1814) 5 Taunton 442 at p. 444. 
The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v. McGregor (1929) 41 CLR 254 at p. 266. Isaacs J. also referred to 
Wilmot L.C.J. in Tullidge v. Wade (1769) 3 Wils 18 (action in trespass for loss of services by a father 
against a man who seduced his daughter was described by Wilmot L.C.J.at p. 19 as 'brought for example's 
sake'; with the jury having the right to give 'liberal damages'). 
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4. Common Law Punitive Damages within the Modern Australian Legal 
Framework 
One of the most important cases discussing punitive damages is Gray v. Motor Accident 
Commission.46 In Gray, the defendant Bransden deliberately drove his motor car into a 
group of people, injuring the plaintiff, Mr. Gray. Bransden was convicted of intentionally 
causing grievous bodily harm, and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. Gray 
successfully sued in negligence for damages for personal injury, but the trial judge 
dismissed his claim for exemplary damages on the basis that Bransden had already been 
punished by the criminal court. The High Court of Australia affirmed this decision. 
Gleeson C.J., McHugh, Gummow and Hayne J.J. observed that: 
'The increasing frequency with which civil penalty provisions are enacted,47 the provisions 
made for criminal injuries compensation,48 the provisions now made in some jurisdictions 
for the judge at a criminal trial to order restitution49 or compensation to a person suffering 
loss or damage (including pain and suffering) as a result of an offence50 all deny the existence 
of any 'sharp cleavage' between the criminal and the civil law'.51 
Their Honours' statement needs further elucidation. Penalties, whether physical or 
economic, are at the core of every criminal law system; however, it was only in the final 
three decades of the 20th century, that Australian legislatures begun to routinely insert 
civil penalties (whether expressed in terms of penalty units or penalties specified in 
monetary amounts) into civil statutes. These civil penalties may be relatively minor or 
run into hundreds of thousands of dollars. For example, Medical Treatment Act 1988 
(Vic), s. 5 allows adults with full mental capacity ('sound mind') to execute a 'refusal of 
treatment certificate' relating to medical treatment generally or of a particular kind for 
the patient's current condition. The legislation has also created an offence of medical 
trespass to punish registered medical practitioners who 'knowing that a refusal of 
treatment certificate applies to a person, undertake or continue to undertake any medical 
treatment to which the certificate applies'. The punishment is 5 penalty units 
(US$ 597.25). 
At the other end of penal monetary spectrum, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s. 1317G 
provides for civil pecuniary penalties of US$ 200,000 for an individual; or US$ 1 million 
for a body corporate for contraventions of its provisions listed in s. 1317E. Pecuniary 
penalties are defined under s. 1317G as 'a civil debt payable to ASIC [Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission] on the Commonwealth's behalf'. The legislation specifies 
ins. 1317H (2) that 'ASIC or the Commonwealth may enforce the order as if it were an 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Gray v. Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR L 
See e.g. Corporations Law Act 1989 (Cth), Pt 9.4B; since replaced by Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
See e.g. Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1978 (SA). 
See e.g. Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), s. 52; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), Pt 4, D I. 
See, e.g., Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), s. 53; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), Pt 4, D 2. 
Ibid., at pp. 7-8 [16]. 
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order made in civil proceedings against the person to recover a debt due by the person. 
The debt arising from the order is taken to be a judgment debt'. 
Just like criminal fines, civil penalties are meted out as punishment for the defendant's 
breach of a statutory prohibition (rather than the damage suffered by the plaintiff); and, 
just like fines; they are collected by the Crown (Federal, State or Territory treasury). Yet, 
unlike criminal fines, civil penalties are imposed on defendants whose liability is 
determined on the balance of probabilities. The proof on the balance of probabilities is 
also a feature of common law punitive damages, though they are awarded for the benefit 
of the individual plaintiff, not the State. 
Defendants who are tried, convicted and punished in a criminal court, as well as 
being found liable in civil proceedings on facts arising from the same incident, have to 
pay compensatory, and if applicable, aggravated, but not exemplary damages. In Gray 
the High Court of Australia observed that that since the object of awarding exemplary 
damages is to punish the wrongdoer in 'an emphatic and a public way', the court should 
take into consideration the fact that this was already achieved by criminal conviction, or 
that conviction is likely to follow. Though the issue was not discussed at the time, it is 
arguable that compensatory, 52 but not punitive damages should be awarded where the 
court orders the defendant to pay a civil penalty. 
5. Statutory Compensation and Restitution Orders under Criminal Law 
Though it did not pertain to Gray, in tandem with legislation vesting civil courts with 
power to impose civil penalties in certain cases, in some States, criminal courts' 
jurisdiction has been extended to include (in addition to imposition of prison sentences, 
community orders, and fines), the power to make orders requiring the offender to make 
restitution 53 or pay compensation to the injured victim of the offence. 54 For example, in 
Victoria, by virtue of the Sentencing Act 1991, s. SSB, persons who had suffered an injury 
as a direct result of the offence of which the offender has been found guilty or convicted, 
may ask the sentencing court to order: 
52 
53 
54 
55 
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'the offender to pay compensation of such amount as the court thinks fit for ... (a) pain and 
suffering experienced by the victim as a direct result of the offence; (b) ... any expenses 
actually incurred, or reasonably likely to be incurred, by the victim for reasonable counselling 
services as a direct result of the offence; (c) ... any medical expenses actually and reasonably 
incurred, or reasonably likely to be incurred, by the victim as a direct result of the offence; (d) 
any other expenses actually and reasonably incurred, or reasonably likely to be incurred, by 
the victim as a direct result of the offence, not including any expense arising from loss of or 
damage to property'. ss 
See e.g., compensation orders under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s. 1317H; s. 1317HA ands. 1317HB. 
For example in cases of theft, see Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), s. 84. 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), s. 50(3)(b); s. 74; s. 77; ands. 83F(2)(ii). 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), s. 86 sets out a statutory regime of compensation by offenders found guilty of 
causing for property losses to the victim. 
Danuta Mendelson 
In cases where the victim has suffered loss, destruction, or damage to property as a result 
of the offence, under s. 86(1), the court may order that the offender 'pay any compensation 
... that the court thinks fit'. Where a person has been found 'guilty or convicted of an 
offence connected with the theft', s. 84 of Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) enables the court to 
make restitution orders. 56 These curial powers are not new. Provisions of Lex Ribuaria, 
a 7th century collection of the laws of the Ripuarian Franks from Colonge in Germany, 
mandated that the fine imposed on the wrongdoer should not be collected 'until 
compensation was paid to the private victim of the injury. 57 This ancient principle is 
preserved in the Sentencing Act, which provides that where the offender pleads insufficient 
means to pay both, a fine and restitution or compensation, 'the court must give preference 
to restitution or compensation, though it may impose a fine as well'. 58 
Section SSL of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) vests in the victims of an offence the right 
'to recover damages for any expense or other matter so far as it is not satisfied by payment 
or recovery of compensation under' the provisions of the Sentencing Act. However, given 
the expense of civil litigation and the impecunious state of most offenders, for the vast 
majority of victims this option is theoretical rather than practical. Statutory language of 
the Sentencing Act refers to compensatory and restitutionary 'orders' with the implication 
that the orders form part of the punishment. In substance, however, these orders cross the 
boundary from criminal law to private law, and indeed, under Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), 
s. 85M 'a compensation order, including costs ordered to be paid by the offender on the 
proceeding for that order, must be taken to be a judgment debt due by the offender to the 
person in whose favour the order is made and payment of any amount remaining unpaid 
under the order may be enforced in the court by which it was made'. 59 The writ of debt is 
one of the oldest common law Forms of Action, and the notion of debt as civil institution 
goes back to Aristotle.60 However, offender-debtors can only repay a debt if they are 
capable and/or have the means of doing so. In the great majority of cases, imposition of 
restitutionary and compensatory orders as part of sentencing process is not realistic. In 
these cases, to alleviate financial hardships suffered by victims of crime, since the 1970s, 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Under s. 84(1), the court may, inter alia, order that: (a) 'the person who has possession or control of the 
stolen goods restore them to the person entitled to them; and/or (b) 'the offender deliver or transfer to 
another person goods that directly or indirectly represent the stolen goods (that is, goods that are the 
proceeds of any disposal or realisation of the whole or part of the stolen goods or of goods so representing 
them)'; and/or (c) 'a sum not exceeding the value of the stolen goods be paid to another person out of 
money taken from the offender's possession on his or her arrest'. 
Harding 2002 at p. 27. The author adds that is such cases, however, 'a third of the sum was to be pledged 
before witnesses to the king's fisc (not given to the judge), 'so that firm peace shall endure forever' (ut 
pax perpetua stabilis permaneat)'. 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), s. 50(4)(b). The priority of payment of restitution or compensation to the 
victim over penalties to be paid by the offender to the State is reinforced by Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic), 
s. 30, which mandates that where the offender's property is restrained (confiscated and sold by the 
State), the State must ensure that any order for restitution, compensation or damages made under the 
Sentencing Act 1991 'is satisfied, to the value of the restrained property', before the proceeds from the 
restrained property can be used for any other purpose. See also Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic), s. 31. 
Likewise, s. 85(1) of Sentencing Act 1991 specifies that restitutionary orders involving payments of money 
(rather than specific restitution of stolen goods under s. 84(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)), 'must 
be taken to be a judgment debt due by the offender to the person in whose favour the order is made ... .' 
Aristotle 1934, p. l 132a. 
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all Australian States and Territories have enacted statutory schemes which enable victims 
and their close relatives to obtain capped statutory compensation for personal injury.61 
The availability of statutory compensation does not affect a person's right to commence or 
maintain common law proceedings;62 though again, the award of punitive damages would 
be contingent on whether the defendant has been or is likely to be sentenced. 
The expanded the power of the civil courts to impose civil penalties and the criminal 
courts to make compensatory and restitutionary orders has meant that in the 21st century, 
punitive damages are no longer the sole institution through which judges in civil 
proceeding can express their condemnation of the particular defendant's egregious 
conduct. The question then arises, what is the place and function of punitive damages in 
modern Australian law? 
6. Distinction between Punitive and Aggravated Damages 
In their reluctance to draw a firm and principled line between aggravated and punitive 
damages, the courts have not made the answer to this question easy. 
Historically, until mid-13th century, heads of damages for personal injury were 
generally undifferentiated. Plaintiffs suing in tort would claim (lay) a single sum in 
damages with the determination of the final amount left to the court's discretion. For 
example, in Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 63 Mr. Fabrigas, a native Minorquin, sued General 
Mostyn, the Governor of Minorca, for trespass and false imprisonment. In 1771, while in 
Minorca, Mostyn without a legal cause, but on suspicion that Fabrigas may be fomenting 
unrest, having seized and imprisoned the plaintiff for six days, banished him for 12 
months to Carthagena (which was under Spanish rule). The plaintiff claimed £10,000 in 
damages. On the facts in Fabrigas, though unarticulated, the jury's award of £3000 and 
£90 in costs was punitive. However, De Grey C.]. observed that it was: 
'very difficult [for the court] to interpose with respect to the quantum of damages (awarded by 
juries] in actions for any personal wrong. Not that it can be laid down, that in no case of 
personal injury the damages can be excessive. Some may be so monstrous and excessive, as to 
be in themselves an evidence of passion or partiality in the jury'. 64 
Even after punitive damages were doctrinally distinguished from aggravated, the 
judiciary did not insist that the distinction be observed. The difficulty of observing the 
61 
62 
63 
64 
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distinction was noted by Windeyer J. of the High Court of Australia in Uren v. John 
Fairfax Ltd. & Sons, 65 a defamation case, his Honour noted that: 
'in truth a punitive or vindictive element does lurk in many cases in which the damages were 
aggravated by the defendant's conduct ... Limiting the scope of terms that often were not 
distinguished in application makes possible an apparently firm distinction between aggravated 
compensatory damages and exemplary or punitive damages. How far the different labels 
denote concepts really different in effect may be debatable. I suspect that in seeking to preserve 
the distinction we shall sometimes find ourselves dealing more in words than ideas'. 66 
Justice Windeyer's concerns over the failure to clearly conceptualise aggravated damages 
were exemplified in Carson v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd, 67 another defamation case 
determined by the High Court. In Carson, McHugh J. observed that common law juries 
can award aggravated damages when they consider it 'necessary to provide a proper 
consolation for the plaintiff'. 68 He cited with approval Lord Hailsham L.C., who in 
Broome v. Cassell & Co69 said that juries can 'inflict an added burden on the defendant 
proportionate to his conduct', if 'the injury to the plaintiff is actually greater and, as the 
result of the conduct exciting the indignation, demands a more generous solatium'. 70 
McHugh J. added that 'in awarding aggravated damages, the anger or indignation which 
the jury feels at the way the defendant has treated the plaintiff is a proper reason for 
making a large rather than a small award to compensate the plaintiff'. 71 Lord Hailsham 
L.C. and McHugh J. conflated the notion of aggravated damages with extra financial 
burden as punishment imposed on the defendant (quintessence of the punitive damages 
doctrine). The reference to aggravated damages as providing 'consolation' is baffling, for 
this is the function of damages for pain and suffering.72 The institution of 'solatium' was 
rejected in Blake v. Midland Rly. Co.73 and does not form part of the English and 
Australian common law. Urging juries to express their 'anger or indignation' at the 
defendant's conduct by compensating the plaintiff for a 'greater injury' through 'large' 
rather than 'small' awards erases the line between aggravated and punitive damages. 
Judicial failure to provide clear distinction between the two, may explain why several 
legislatures have responded by abolishing outright or placing limitations upon both, 
exemplary and aggravated damages. 
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7. The Place of Common Law Punitive Damages in Contemporary 
Australian Jurisprudence 
In Lamb v. Cotogno, 74 a case involving an award of punitive damages for trespass to the 
person, Mason C.J., Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron J.J. in a joint judgment, 
proclaimed that 'exemplary damages may be awarded in Australia for a wide range of 
torts'. 
Indeed, by the late 1990s some State and Territory courts began awarding punitive 
damages for negligence75 in addition to battery,76 assault,77 false imprisonment,78 
tort of interfering with contractual relations,79 trespass to land, 80 trespass to goods, 
misfeasance in public office, 81 malicious prosecution, 82 conversion and trespass to 
goods, 83 deceit, defamation, libel and slander. 84 At this point the High Court decided 
to rein in the judicial enthusiasm for this head of damages, and in Gray v. Motor Accident 
Commission, 85 the majority observed that: 
'exemplary damages could not properly be awarded in a case of alleged negligence in which 
there was no conscious wrongdoing by the defendant. Ordinarily, then, questions of exemplary 
damages will not arise in most negligence cases be they motor accident or other kinds of 
case'.86 
The High Court in Gray provided for an exception involving cases where employees can 
establish that they suffered harm because the employer-defendant recklessly failed to 
protect their safety. 87 Such awards of punitive damages could be awarded only if the 
defendant has not been already punished. For example, punitive damages would be 
precluded in the case of successful prosecution under the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act 2004 (Vic), s. 32, which provides that a 'person who, without lawful excuse, recklessly 
engages in conduct that places or may place another person who is at a workplace in 
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danger of serious injury' commits an indictable offence'. The penalty under s. 32(a) and 
(b) is 'a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years, or a fine not exceeding 1800 penalty 
units, or both' for a natural person; and 'a fine not exceeding 9000 penalty units' for a 
body corporate. 
The case of Lamb v. Cotogno is both an authority for the modern doctrine of punitive 
damages at common law, and an example ofits jurisprudential and practical shortcomings. 
In Lamb, Garry James Lamb, the defendant, drove into the driveway of Giuseppe 
Cotogno's property and served him with summons. Cotogno refused to accept the 
service of summons, threatened to kill Lamb; and when Lamb got into his car and began 
to drive away, Cotogno 'threw himself across the bonnet of the car and held on to the 
guttering at the sides of the windscreen'. 88 While driving at speed of 35 to 40 kilometers 
per hour along the road, Lamb tried to dislodge him; eventually he braked so sharply 
that Cotogno was thrown from the bonnet onto the road, fracturing bones in both feet. 
Lamb drove off. 89 The trial judge determined that while Lamb acted without malice, 
exemplary damages should be awarded against him because he 'callously abandon[ ed) 
the plaintiff on the road and sped off in the night leaving him lying on a darkened 
road'.90 
The High Court acknowledged that under the then relevant legislation any damages, 
including punitive damages, awarded against Lamb would be paid by his motor vehicle 
insurer. However, according to their Honours: 
'Whilst an award of exemplary damages against a compulsorily insured motorist may have a 
limited deterrent effect upon him or upon other motorists also compulsorily insured, the 
deterrent effect is undiminished for those minded to engage in conduct of a similar nature 
which does not involve the use of a motor vehicle'.91 
Their Honours added: 
'Moreover, whilst the smart or sting will obviously not be the same if the defendant does not 
have to pay an award of exemplary damages, it does serve to mark the court's condemnation 
of the defendant's behaviour and its effect is not entirely to be discounted by the existence of 
compulsory insurance'.92 
Presumably, their Honours meant that the case would deter bicycle riders from speeding 
off in the night leaving their victims unattended. If so, the Cotogno deterrent was 
ineffective. For example in Hollis v. Vabu,93 a cyclist collided with a pedestrian, Mr. 
Hollis, causing the latter to fall and badly injure his knee. The cyclist said 'sorry mate' 
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and left the scene, pushing his bicycle. Mr. Hollis, obtained compensatory (but not 
punitive) damages from the cyclist's employer. 
However, the High Court's approach raises more serious questions. Namely, why 
should public policy considerations, which are extraneous to the case at the bar, govern 
recovery of civil damages? Why should Mr. Cotogno get a windfall that is paid for by all 
compulsorily insured innocent motorists through increased premiums? 
It is arguable that if Mr. Lamb's conduct of driving away from Mr. Cotogno was 
punishable, he should have been tried for it under criminal law.94 Under criminal law, 
however, the prosecution would have had difficulty establishing mens rea (the judge 
found that he acted without malice), and Mr. Lamb would have been able to raise defence 
of provocation (not available in civil actions except in Queensland). 
The Cotongo case was overcome by the Parliaments of New South Wales and Victoria, 
which prohibited outright any awards of punitive damages under their respective 
compulsory motor vehicle accident regimes.95 Legislation in Queensland, Tasmania,96 
and South Australia ensured that such damages are personally payable by the tortfeasor, 
and cannot be claimed against motor vehicle insurers.97 
The power of courts to award punitive damages was further constrained in 2002 and 
2003. During that period all Australian Parliaments enacted Torts Reform legislation, 
which, inter alia, codified principles of the cause of action in negligence for personal 
injury (breach of duty of care, causation and defences), imposed tests on availability of 
damages and caps on quantum.98 The Northern Territory Parliament prohibited outright 
'awards of aggravated damages or exemplary damages in respect of a personal injury'.99 
Likewise, the Commonwealth legislation prohibits courts from awarding exemplary 
and/or aggravated damages in respect of product liability100 and unconscionable 
conduct101 relating to claims for death or personal injury under the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth). 102 The prohibition applies to both intentionally and negligently occasioned 
personal injury. 
In New South Wales, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s. 21, which limits 'exemplary, 
punitive and aggravated damages', provides that: 'In an action for the award of personal 
injury damages where the act or omission that caused the injury or death was negligence, 
a court cannot award exemplary or punitive damages or damages in the nature of 
aggravated damages'. In Queensland, a court cannot award punitive or aggravated damages 
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for personal injury, unless 'the act that caused the personal injury was (a) an unlawful 
intentional act done with intent to cause personal injury; or (b) an unlawful sexual assault 
or other unlawful sexual misconduct'.103 This means that in these jurisdictions while 
punitive and aggravated damages would be available for some, but not all intentional torts; 
by definition they cannot be awarded for unintentional torts, such as negligence. 
Legislation in Victoria, 104SouthAustralia, 105Tasmania, 106WesternAustralia 107 and the 
Australian Capital Territory108 does not refer to punitive damages in relation to either 
intentionally or negligently inflicted personal injuries, which means that they are 
governed by common law. In most jurisdictions, punitive damages remain available for 
injuries and death resulting from smoking or other use of tobacco products. Australian 
Capital Territory, Northern Territory Queensland, and Tasmania prohibit recovery of 
aggravated or punitive damages in personal injury proceedings against a deceased 
estate.109 Under the Commonwealth, Queensland, Tasmania, the Northern Territory, 
and the Australian Capital Territory legislation, the Crown (the government) is not liable 
to pay punitive damages for the conduct of police officers, though the officers found 
liable can be personally punished in this manner.no In contrast, New South Wales has 
preserved the plaintiff's right to an award of punitive damages from the Crown for torts 
committed by police officers (New South Wales v. Ibbett111 ).112 
Punitive damages are not available for breach of contract; and, importantly, in 2005 
all Australian jurisdictions legislatively abolished punitive damages for defamation.113 
However, with notable exception of defamation, the legislative provisions have been 
uncoordinated, and usually enacted on ad hoc basis. Thus in some jurisdictions, some 
torts still sound in punitive damages while others do not; a negligently injured person 
may claim punitive damages in Victoria but not in New South Wales, Queensland, or the 
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Northern Territory. As a result, the law of punitive damages in Australia is a highly 
unsatisfactory farrago of provisions, rules and case law. 
8. Conclusion 
If the trend towards legislative abolition of common law punitive damages in torts 
continues unabated, they are likely to become virtually extinct. Is this trend regrettable? 
Possibly not, for punitive damages are not a remedy; yet, unlike compensatory damages, 
the court (judge or jury) is vested with unrestricted discretion in determining their 
quantum. In Australia, statutory law has developed jurisprudentially more apposite ways 
of deterring wrongdoers and punishing contumelious conduct through the system of 
civil penalties. Europe would be wise to give punitive damages a wide berth and explore 
the notion of civil fines instead. 
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